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The purpose of this work is to analyse how political risk has evolved and changed recently 
and how its transformation affected foreign direct investment worldwide. By referring to the 
latest events in the spheres of politics and economics, this paper will provide a detailed 
analysis of the existing political risk methodologies, as well as thereof adaptability to the 
challenges of the present.  
 
The current views on the nature of political risk will be summarized and evaluated with an 
attempt to formulate a new definition, which would encompass the latest trends in the de-
velopment of political risk. 
 
Additional factors of political risk are established in this work to complement the existing 
quantification models. Ideally, this will benefit the models by adapting them to the trans-
forming political risk. 
 
Finally, the ways in which more traditional types of political risk exhibit themselves present-
ly will be demonstrated with the example of oil industry, with suggestions as to how these 
types of risk can be mitigated in the future. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Political risk and analysis thereof in the international context has always represented 
an important aspect of conducting business in a foreign country, and it is undoubtfully 
even more significant in the current times of a rapid growth of international trade and 
investment. 
 
The concept of political risk analysis can be dated back to the time of ancient Babylon, 
where Hebrew bankers had a network of couriers who delivered political intelligence 
sourced by their network of spies located throughout the known world (Overholt, 1982). 
Although social sciences have undoubtfully progressed since then and a much more 
extensive scope of information can be gathered and analyzed for the purpose of 
investment decision making, the environment of international business has also 
become much more complicated, which calls for the constant revision, improvement of 
the methods of political risk analysis. 
 
Any investment carries the underlying principle of uncertainty of the level of return. In 
the international context, the return on investment becomes a subject to a whole new 
myriad of risks, which are outside of the control of an investor. Just as an international 
investor may enjoy favourable political atmosphere in a host country, in a similar 
manner the investment may be seized, nationalized or prohibited to transfer the profits. 
In an absence of a powerful global institution, which would be able to resolve 
international investment disputes and full sovereignty of states over investments within 
their territory, there is little to protect a foreign investor from belligerent actions of a host 
government. Thus, a need in clearly defined political risks analysis arises. 
 
In order to measure the scope of political risk a particular country and compare the 
potential host countries to one another, various models are used to quantify the level of 
potential uncertainty. These models, to be discussed more in-detail further in this work, 
are constituted by factors and indicators of risk, which are to assess the presence of 
certain risks within a market. Various models vary by the amount of factors used and 
methods to quantify data. 
 
It is important to note that the phenomenon of political risk is highly subjective, and any 
attempts to quantify a matter as fluid as political risk is a subject to an analyst’s 
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available information and other factors, as was described by Simon (1984). 
Nevertheless, comprehensive in-depth analyses are practical for the assessment of a 
potential host country with the respect to the political risk. 
 
 As the global balance of power is changing, new political movements emerge and 
conflicts flare up, it seems necessary to reevaluate the models used to analyze political 
risks and examine whether the risks themselves are transforming. The objective of this 
work is to find out whether the nature of political risk has transformed and the ways in 
which latest aspects of political risk manifest themselves. Case studies will be used to 
complement the theoretical findings. This work will also try to suggest what 
improvements can made to the existing risk models for the latter to be more adaptable 
to the transforming nature of political risk. By complementing the risk rating 
methodologies used today, the findings of this work will assist the risk analysis for it to 
become more adaptable to the uncertainty prevailing the markets at present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 (39) 
 
 
2 Political risk and foreign direct investment: a conceptualization 
 
From 2004 to 2012, the total flow of foreign direct investments more than doubled, 
reaching nearly USD 1,500 billion in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2013). As a way of international 
investment “by a resident in one economy with the objective of obtaining a lasting 
interest in an enterprise resident in another economy” (OECD, 2013), FDI has become 
one of the major methods of cross-border investment and one of the most active 
drivers of economic growth. It plays a significant role in the process of capital formation 
for countries of the developing world, especially through exchange of technologies and 
managerial practices and knowledge. By bringing in capital, especially in the form of 
foreign currency, FDI helps to generate more investment within the host country and 
improve its balance of trade, thus further enhancing the cycle of growth. Along with 
certain negative sides, FDI has produced positive externalities and “spillover” effects, 
such as, for example, infrastructure projects. 
 
Nevertheless, the extent of the flow of foreign direct investment is highly dependent on 
the political atmosphere of the host country. The well-being of legal institutions, level of 
corruption, political stability, and ability to protect intellectual rights are only some of the 
factors affecting the flow of FDI into a host country. The vast variety of organizations 
seek to analyze and structure the information about countries in order to make an 
assessment of an economy’s ability to perform well in modern world (World Economic 
forum, 2015). While the results of this research activity are not specifically tailored for 
the purpose of the investors, they have a high degree of correlation with the FDI 
inflows. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that 4 out of 10 countries that topped 
World Economic Forum’s GCI Global Competitiveness Index ranking in 2014, namely 
Hong Kong, the US, UK, Singapore, (World Economic forum, 2015) were also among 
the 5 largest recipients of FDI in the same year (UNCTAD, 2015). In a similar fashion, 
10 leaders of The 2016 IMD World Competitiveness Scoreboard (IMD, 2016) represent 
5 out of 10 top host economies by the amount of FDI inflows, namely US, Hong Kong, 
Netherlands, Singapore and Canada (UNCTAD, 2016).   
 
The examples presented above show that a significant part of an economy’s 
attractiveness to Foreign Direct investment is defined by a country’s ability to exhibit 
certain principles – such as basic requirements of stability of institutions and 
macroeconomic environment, efficiency enhancers, such as country’s educational 
standards, goods and labour market efficiency, development of financial markets and 
4 (39) 
 
 
technological readiness, and openness to innovation and business sophistication – in 
the view of the World Economic Forum’s GC Report (World Economic forum: 
Methodology, 2015); and overall economic performance data, complemented by issues 
of management practices, corruption, standards of living and environmental issues – in 
the case of IMD (Frequently Asked Questions, 2015). In addition to this, various 
studies, including those of an econometric nature and empirical analyses, have shown 
the linkage between the existence of democratic procedures, rule of law and 
intellectual rights protection and flow of FDI into a host country (Busse, Hefeker, 2015). 
Similarly, Brunetti and Weder (1998) point out the empirical evidence that certain 
indicators, which can be grouped into four main categories: government instability, 
political violence, policy uncertainty and enforcement uncertainty, may be the most 
detrimental to an economy’s attractiveness to investors. Kaufmann et al. (1999) of the 
World Bank, in addition to the indicators discussed above, mention government 
effectiveness and regulatory burden. 
 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that some of the indicators that are traditionally 
associated with the country’s compliance with the principles of rule of law and 
democratic institutions have only limited influence on the FDI flow, or only a limited 
amount of such factors have evident impact. As such, in “Political Risk, Institutions and 
Foreign Direct Investment”  by Busse and Hefeker (2005), perhaps one of  the most 
comprehensive studies on the correlation between political risk factors, institutions and 
FDI flows, it was found that although some factors of risk, such as government stability, 
law and order and quality of bureaucracy do indeed correlate with the investment inflow 
in a host country, other factors have exhibited no statistical correlation to the FDI 
inflow. Similarly, as was suggested by Li and Resnick, democratic institutions may as 
well have negative effect on the FDI inflow. Li and Resnick (2003) pointed out that in 
countries under authoritarian rule, the leadership of the country may offer more 
favourable conditions to the MNEs willing to invest in this country.  
 
Furthermore, Li and Resnick (2003) continue, in the absence of democratic 
procedures, MNEs may enjoy broad access to the country’s officials with the purpose 
of seeking protection and promotion of their interests, which makes such a host country 
more investment-attractive. In a similar manner, as foreign investors favour the 
principles of rule of law in the host country, they can be discouraged by constraints on 
foreign capital. Similarly with transitional economies, it may be the case that they first 
have to consolidate power before they are able to promote property rights protection. 
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O’Donnell (1978), discussing the transformation of Latin American states into what he 
referred to as “Bureaucratic authoritarian states”, noticed that countries at such state 
may be able to demonstrate political and economic stability – features that 
characterized these economies before the change for authoritarian regimes. 
Bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, O’Donnell’s (1978) idea follows, may be better at 
demonstrating that there is enough political stability in the country to ensure the 
commitment to securing policies which make an economy attractive to foreign capital, 
in addition to speculative advantages or “special treatment”, which a state would not be 
able to offer in presence of democratic procedures. 
 
Therefore, it may be concluded that although international capital seems to be more 
attracted to countries where democratic procedures are observed, authoritarian 
regimes may, in some cases, be more effective in the same job, as was found out by 
Busse and Hefeker (2005) by the means of analyzing the econometric data, and by 
O’Donnell (1978) in a more empirical study of the transitional Latin American countries. 
In a similar fashion, only a limited number of indicators of political risk have a significant 
correlation with the FDI inflow into a host country (Busse and Hefeker, 2005). 
 
2.1 The Many Meanings of Political Risk 
 
Extensive yet fragmentary definitions of political risk can be found in literature on the 
topic. While most of authors agree that this type of risk is constituted by government 
action that presents a danger to business transactions, there is a disagreement about 
the scope of this action, or what aspects of government action can be characterized as 
political risk.  
 
One group of researchers define political risk as general government’s intrusion regard-
ing business transactions, for example Weston and Sorge (p.60, 1972) note that  
“Political risks arise from the actions of national governments which interfere with or 
prevent business transactions, or change the terms of agreements, or cause the con-
fiscation of wholly or partially foreign owned business property”  (cited in Kobrin, 1978, 
p.4) 
 
Nevertheless, another group of researchers considers political risks to be separate 
occasions of new pieces of legislation or actions taken against the interest of a particu-
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lar company, or the mix of the two. As such, Root (1972) defines political risk as “pos-
sible occurrence of a political event of any kind (such as war, revolution, coup d’etat, 
expropriation, taxation, devaluation, exchange controls and import restrictions) at home 
or abroad that can cause a loss of profit potential and/or assets in an international 
business operation” (in Kobrin, 1978, p.7). 
 
The two approaches complement each other. However, fuller definition of political risk 
should be able to take into account both sides of such a complex phenomenon. A 
broader definition was proposed by Louis T. Wells of Harvard Business School, who 
defined political risk as “...threats to profitability that are the result of forces external to 
the industry and which involve some sort of governmental action or inaction” (in Moran, 
1998, p.15), thus separating risks of political nature from those that are caused by eco-
nomic conditions and acts of nature. Although this definition successfully accounts for 
both event and policy-type of government interference, it seems less successful in de-
fining the origins of the risk. For example, a civil war, in the course of which a foreign 
investor may lose the invested capital, may not be a result of government action or 
inaction, but rather an outcome of complex historical, political and social conflicts with a 
state. 
A lot of similarities can be found between country risk analysis and that of political risk. 
Used to forecast possible issues in cross-border transfer of capital, country risk analy-
sis aims to assess the future risks by accounting various factors, such as political, so-
cial both macro and microeconomic together with countries’ ratings and other 
measures of economic performance (McGowan, Moeller, 2009). Although such indica-
tors may be quite useful in assessing the investment climate of a host country, they do 
not take into full account all the peculiarities of political risk. There may be a country 
with relatively low levels of country risk but a great exposure to political risk - for exam-
ple, a wealthy and competitive country that is politically unstable. Brink (2004) specu-
lates about the probability that a country attracting financing from abroad may be able 
to serve the interest on its loans, but unwilling to do so for reasons of ideological or 
other sort. This example shows the interconnection between the two types of analysis 
and the kind of policy problems that could have been foreseen by a more profound 
political risk analysis (Brink, 2004).  
 
Some other authors (Finnerty, 2001) consider currency inconvertibility as a case of 
political risk. Brink (2004) mentions imposing high quality standards and safety regula-
tions that, being imposed upon foreign firms, may disadvantage them in comparison 
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with local competitors. Although the latter definitions are less encircling than those 
mentioned above, they seem to be rather better at encompassing the complexity of 
interrelations of a country’s economic and political systems.  
 
Therefore, more comprehensive definition of a political risk to FDI should take into ac-
count the diverse nature of its origins, including both the event and policy aspects, as 
well as the possibility of general political and/or economic instability within a state. For 
the purpose of this paper I would like to define political risk as any potential threat to 
profitability or assets allocated in a host country that arises as a result of a country’s 
political or socioeconomical turmoil or the government’s action, rights violations or re-
strictions. 
 
2.2 Traditional and new risks 
 
In general, Wells (cited in Moran, 1998) suggests that the variety of types of political 
risks can be grouped into two main categories: traditional and new. 
 
To the traditional risks, Wells attributed the risks of nationalisation and expropriation, 
which, although less present in our days, still present a danger for an investor. Nation-
alisation of Venezuela’s oil industry, followed by a more recent example of seizure of 
Repsol’s stake in Argentinian YFP, which was seen as “a measure that threatens to 
scare off foreign investors” (Bronstein, 2012), indicated that such extreme develop-
ments are not in the past, but rather follow many countries that find themselves in the 
troubles of economic distress. Wars and civil disturbances have not disappeared either. 
Conflicts in countries of former USSR, complete reconfiguration of powers in the Middle 
East and centrifugal forces in the EU may lead to investors’ uncertainty. Economic na-
tionalism, an example of which was described above with Argentina’s YFP, too still 
exists.  
 
At the same time, new sources of political risk have come into existence. In countries 
with corrupt political leadership, local businesses may exploit their political connection 
to gain preference for themselves to the disadvantage of foreign firms. In the current 
situation of the absence of a powerful international regulatory body, this particular risk 
seems to have special potential. A risk of sanctions, that had various examples recent-
ly, represents another threat for international businesses: it leaves them in the middle 
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of a political standoff between the governments and bears costs associated with the 
divesting and selling of their assets. 
 
It would be a mistake, however, to associate political risk solely with the countries of 
the developing world and volatile political systems. Although it is the case that emerg-
ing markets are traditionally believed to possess higher risks of political nature, the 
potential sources of vulnerability can be found in the most advanced economies too. As 
such, debt-ceiling negotiations and continuing political polarization in the US are being 
accounted as political risks in Goldman Sachs’s investment strategy (Mossavar-
Rahmani, Nelson, 2015). 
2.3 Political risk at present 
 
While the world has been long accustomed to the risks originating in the developing 
world, the changing geography of political risks has been noted by many authors. Gold 
and Kantchev (2016) mention the environment of increasing uncertainty in the Europe-
an Union, listing the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, reconfiguration of the 
political establishment in many European countries, the constitutional referendum in 
Italy, and the European banking system as some of the risk factors. According to Bar-
clay’s head of macro-research Ajay Rajadhyaksha, “Europe is once again becoming 
the ground zero for political risk” (cited in Gold and Kantchev (2016).  
 
In addition to the previously discussed new developments in the risk classification, 
there is one aspect of political risk that has received significantly less coverage in the 
literature but is certainly gaining more and more importance at the time of writing this 
paper, and which exhibited itself in the areas of world that have been regarded as the 
least politically risky before. As such, the UK’s of withdrawal from the EU, a process 
referred to as “Brexit”, and the United States presidential election of 2016 are seen 
today as potential sources of risk. This represents an interesting phenomenon which 
could hardly be found in the developed world before: the referendum in the UK and 
presidential elections in the United States, although normal democratic procedures in 
their nature, are viewed by many as sources of general political uncertainty of the pre-
sent (Fleming, Foley; 2016). Although any vote of a national scope, be it Brexit refer-
endum or the presidential elections in the US, is bound to have long-term global and 
regional implications, already because of the size of the economies where the votes 
take place, the two events draw especial attention due to the level of significance they 
have on the economies of these countries, the regions and eventually the world: “The 
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possibility of a Trump victory in the presidential election — which could lead to a signif-
icant challenge to globalisation — is one of the looming outcomes that could hit ill-
prepared investors.” (Fleming, Foley; 2016). Some economists share similar concerns 
about Britain’s withdrawal from the EU, mentioning uncertainty as one of the possible 
outcomes of the event: “Worse export performance due to inferior EU access for 
business and financial services; lower potential growth and lower consumer spending 
from reduced migration inflows; and weaker investment growth, reflecting the above 
factors plus extra uncertainty.” (Saunders, cited in Giles, 2016). It can be argued, 
however, that standard democratic processes, such as elections or referendums, do 
not constitute political risk – Robock (cited in Kobrin, 1978) points out the necessity of 
elements of unexpectedness and discontinuity for an event or process to be regarded 
as political risk, while it can be debated that Brexit or the US presidential elections 
represent the cases of discontinuity to the regimes of their countries. However, it is also 
clear that the implications of these events will have far-reaching consequences for the 
economies of these countries, not only because of the interconnectedness of the 
political and economic spheres, but also because of changing regulations, revising 
agreements and revisiting the terms of internal trade and cooperation that will be 
dictated by ongoing political changes.   
 
The new political risks associated with unpredictable outcomes, of which Brexit and the 
US presidential campaign serve as perfect examples, are emerging very quickly, while 
they have not been thoroughly studied, and their repercussions can only be assumed. 
Multiple strategies of risk mitigation are used to combat the political risks of the past 
and various unpleasant turns of events can be insured against, but can there be an 
insurance against a result of presidential elections? For the UK, the outcome of the 
Brexit referendum may mean losing the access to the single market of the EU and 
withdrawal from the principle of freedom of movement of labor force, which will in turn 
have an impact on the currency exchange rates and trade balance, ultimately affecting, 
for better or worse, the UK’s image of an economy to invest in. On top of that, 
uncertainty of the future of credit market regulations is certainly adding to the concerns 
of the international investors who may have planned to invest in the UK.  
While it is not clear yet clear what long-term consequences Brexit and the following 
rapid depreciation of the British pound will have on the UK’s economy, it is obvious that 
presumptions about political and economic stability of many countries in the West may 
be revisited: “The referendum result and the subsequent political vacuum are causing 
investors to reassess long-held assumptions about stability and continuity. The 
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damage here has been done quickly. Repairing it will be a long, slow process.” (Barley, 
2016).  
 
Even more troubling consequences may await Britain as a host-country of foreign 
direct investment. Due to the possible loss of access to the single market of the 
European Union as a result of withdrawal from the Union, major American companies 
may revisit their plans of investments in the country, as was stated in a document 
presented to the British Cabinet Office by the United Stated Chamber of Commerce – a 
major business advocacy and lobbying group (Donnan, 2016). According to the 
agency’s officials, withdrawal from the single market would be associated with the 
increase in cost of doing business, losing access to the labour pool of the European 
Union and possible introduction of the new taxes should Britain no longer be a part of 
the European VAT regime (Donnan, 2016). The agency has warned about almost $600 
billion worth of investments in the UK that may be reconsidered as a result of the 
ongoing negotiation of terms of Brexit (Donnan, 2016). 
 
Similar concerns are being shared in another part of the world – Japanese investors 
show signs of uncertainty over the future of their investment to the United Kingdom 
(Parker, 2016). In a similar fashion with their American counterparts, the Japanese 
have been benefiting from the EU’s single market system, in which the United Kingdom 
has been a funnel for their investment in the EU. Parker (2016) further suggests that 
unless the UK government manages to negotiate an access to the single market, the 
Japanese businesses headquartered in the country may decide to relocate their 
operations to elsewhere in continental Europe. Losing access to the single market may 
be felt especially hard by the Japanese automotive industry in the United Kingdom, 
return on investments of which in the production plants in the UK may be hit by 
additional tariffs and taxes should the British government not be able to keep a 
membership in the single market system after Brexit (Parker 2016).  
 
Similar views regarding the outlook for the British economy after Brexit have also been 
expressed by Prime Minister May, who said that although it may be too early to predict 
the final conditions which will define the British-EU relations after Brexit, the economy 
of the UK will most likely experience some troubles: “the reaction of the economy has 
been better than some had predicted after the referendum, but I won’t pretend it will be 
plain sailing” (Giles, Parker; 2016). 
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In the US, similar concerns have arisen in relation to the presidential campaign. The 
turn of events in which Donald Trump wins the presidency may have a significant 
impact on the ongoing principles of globalization and liberalization of free trade, 
particularly the North American Free Trade Agreement and Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
His tough stance on the terms of trade with some countries, for example China, 
resembles specific features of economic nationalism, such as plans to introduce a 45% 
tax on imported Chinese-produced goods, in order to protect American producers and 
encourage American companies to backsource their production (Navarro, 2016). It 
seems quite likely that such drastic turns in the country’s economic policy would make 
many investors revise their investment decisions, and possibly affect the investment 
climate in the United States to a certain degree.  
Zandi et al. (2016) argue that economic isolation as a result of Trump’s policies will 
underlie a reduction of foreign direct investment due to the decrease in foreign trade 
and immigration. A set of other policy proposals, such as raising state-level minimum 
wages, may also increase the costs of doing business, making America a less 
attractive destination for international capital.  “His willingness to threaten higher tariffs 
on U.S. trading partners and his sharp criticism of major trade deals signal a reversal 
on the long-running expansion of U.S. trade and foreign investment”  was noted by 
Zandi et al. (2016) 
 
Wolfers and Zitzewiltz (2016) note that Trump’s victory may cause major damage to 
the stock market and a sharp increase in volatility, unprecedented by a victory of any 
Republican candidate in history. Analysts mention a possible drop in the American, 
British and Asian stock markets by 10-15%, significant reductions in the price of oil and 
Mexican peso. Researchers also noted that this development would go against the 
historical trend set in the 19th century, when the election of a Republican president has 
usually given a rise to the stock market and a drop if a Democrat was elected (Wolfers 
and Zitzewiltz; 2016).  
 
In a similar way, Clinton’s plans of higher scrutiny over the Federal Reserve Bank may 
result in a more cautious interest rate policy, which has recently been one of the main 
drivers of the appreciation of American dollar and thus an incentive for the investments 
in the American markets. 
2.4 Oil industry and political risk 
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Among other factors, oil - its prices and control over its sources - continues to play a 
major role in the political stability of the world in the 21st century. To this day, oil is an 
important source of energy for the advanced economies, and even more so for heavy 
industries of the developing economies.  The spikes in oil prices have proven to be 
able to test not only economies, but even the foundations of the global order: Peck 
(2014) brings up the hints of a possibility in which the United States would use military 
action to capture the oil fields of Saudi Arabia as a reaction to the 1973 oil embargo, 
which was expressed by Defense Secretary Schlesinger in a conversation with the 
British ambassador Lord Cromer (Peck, 2014).  Even larger political consequences the 
crisis had in Europe: according to LaFeber (1975) the oil crisis became the pivotal point 
after which the Western Europe switched to a more pro-Arab position in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The 1973 oil crisis has demonstrated that oil has a potential as a tool of 
international politics: a striking possibility of using military force on the territory of a 
historical ally, such as Saudi Arabia, shows the degree to which uninterrupted flow of 
oil can be crucial for the most powerful countries. Another interesting notion brought up 
by Schlesinger is the relationship developing between oil-producers and consumers. 
Countries exporting oil are gaining the level of geopolitical power which would hardly 
be possible should they not have vast amounts of the commodity at their disposal: “As 
recounted by Lord Cromer, Mr. Schlesinger told him the United States was unwilling to 
abide threats by ''underdeveloped, underpopulated'' countries. The document did not 
rule out the possibility that Washington would consider pre-emptive strikes if Arab gov-
ernments, ''elated by the success of the oil weapon,'' (Alvarez, 2004). 
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that a state views its access to oil, its reserves and opera-
tion of oil industry as a matter of national security. The most important geopolitical 
commodity (Stratfor, 2014) continues to provide a significant share of many of its ex-
porters’ national budgets and play one of the key roles in the formation of conditions for 
economic growth. It is not surprising, therefore, that the control of the oil industry may 
seem to be an attractive prey for the government in situations such economic distress, 
tightening internal policy or more assertive foreign policy, where exports of energy 
sources may be used as an instrument of foreign influence. It would be a mistake, 
however, to assume that the impact in relationship between oil and politics is purely 
unilateral. Oil prices, as prices of any other commodity, are constituted by the Law of 
Supply and Demand, which in their turn are impacted by production capabilities, re-
sources and government policies, in case of supply, and by economic growth and 
availability of other energy sources, in case of demand. Oil price is a subject to expec-
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tations of the players in energy markets and is affected by the availability of the substi-
tutes of oil and other sources of energy. Therefore, it is fair to say that oil prices have 
codependent relations with politics and economics, affecting each other to a high de-
gree.  
 
The risk of nationalization of private oil companies has been marked by many 
examples in the recent past, with some of the most significant examples taking place in 
the states of Southern America. In the region, taking control over the oil industry has 
been taking forms of both nationalization and socialization of the assets of oil 
companies, domestic and foreign alike. Socialization of the oil industry has taken 
especially extreme forms in Venezuela under the regime of Hugo Chavez, during which 
the Venezuelan government has acquired the local businesses of Exxon Mobil and 
ConocoPhillips, with the latter having  had to quit the country, and overtook and the 
major stakes in the holdings of Total SA and Norwegian StatoilHydro ASA 
(Brunnstrom, 2012). While the latter two have been compensated for the loss of their 
stakes, Exxon’s compensation is still to be settled, despite of the New York district 
court’s decision being made in 2015 (Stempel, 2015). 
 
A more recent example of expropriation of the oil sector assets was Argentina’s 
expropriation of YPF, the largest oil company in the country previously controlled by 
Spanish Repsol. The expropriation took place in the conditions of economic hardships 
for Argentina less than half a year after YPF made a public announcement about the 
discovery of the new shale oil site, reserves of which were estimated at up to 1 billion 
barrels (Plummer, 2012).  
 
This case of expropriation, along with Schlesinger’s words and multiple other examples 
recorded in recent history, point to the special role that oil plays among other 
commodities. Although to a much lesser degree that in the recent past, the most 
important geopolitical commodity continues to define politics, affect its consumers and 
producers alike and remain one of the first private assets to fall prey to the state in time 
economic distress.  Is it merely a result of the global revival of nationalism, which has 
been long predicted by various authors (Rachmann in 2014 in The Economist and 
2014 in Financial Times; Schwartz, 2014) or a result of a special status of oil, that 
makes it a vital resource to the state where it is situated?  A more profound insight into 
the politics of oil and political risks associated with the business operations in the oil 
industry will be examined further in this work on the example of the Repsol-YPF case. 
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3 Political risk: the new challenges 
3.1 The transforming nature of political risks: From the Traditional to Uncertainty 
 
Various strategies of mitigating political risk have been developed since the 1970s – 
which many authors mark as the beginning of this discipline – to our day. Most of these 
strategies can be divided into two main groups. First was the approach of using 
qualitative techniques towards assessing a host country as a potential place to invest 
and analyzing the potential risks. This approach involved techniques such as, for 
example, scenario and contingency planning (Overholt, 1982) and concentrated on a 
country’s parameters of political, social, economic, international economic and 
international political sort (Overholt, 1982). At the same time, it is clear that any aspect 
of life of a society, be it, for example, an economic or political infrastructure, are too 
complicated to be understood in their totality, and interconnection between them is 
bound to make any single scenario incomplete. The second approach, sometimes used 
separately or complementing the first approach, underlies a mathematical method of 
making a judgement on a country’s level of political risk. In this method, a number of 
risk factors is first listed, after which a particular country can be given a score on each 
of the factors, with the result, or an average, being a country’s risk assessment. Such 
methodologies are used, for example, by Economist Intelligence Unit, Moody’s and 
S&P (Brink, 2004). Although a number of risk factors used in each of the 
methodologies vary and some are definitely more inclusive than others, the quantitative 
modelling may suffer from insufficient information or from the competition of another 
foreign investor in a host country, who may be more informed or even influence 
investment conditions in a country to create more favourable options for themselves 
(Brink, 2004).  
 
Therefore, it is important to note that before any risk analysis is attempted, a specific 
range of risk factors has to be gathered, including various types of political, economic, 
social and cultural factors. Multiple concepts come into play when the factors of risk, 
needed for a research are put together: for example, Herbert Simon’s concept of 
bounded rationality, implying that analyst’s decision-making cannot be ultimately 
rational, but is rather limited by the scope of available information and resources 
(Simon, 1978).Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s Ludic fallacy in the same principle describes 
how statistical modelling can be counted as productive in their application to real life: 
the complexity of human society will always have more variables than can be 
accounted for (Saltelli, 2014). 
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In my opinion, specific kinds of risk have recently given their place to general instability, 
therefore it is debatable whether existing risk models can adequately address the 
transforming nature of risks.  
 
Numerous recent developments in the realm of politics and new challenges of political 
risk shows the interdependency of the two. To a much greater degree than in the 
recent past, the political discourses aiming at drastic change to the very foundations of 
current economic policies are gaining momentum. In addition to the risks associated 
with the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU and the United States Presidential 
campaign, many other parts of the world are experiencing how politics can fuel political 
uncertainty. Upcoming election campaigns in France and Germany are marked by a 
particular rise in popularity of the forces of the right, who share the ideas of 
Euroscepticism, antiglobalism and a tougher stance on the free trade (Wagstyl, 2016; 
Crisp, 2015; Riedel, Specht,2016).  
 
The antitrade sentiment has gained momentum in the developed world too along with 
the rise of the populist policies. Opposition towards further liberalization of international 
trade, voiced in the United Kingdom during the Brexit campaign and in the United 
States by Donald Trump, are fueling uncertainty and may, being materialized in a large 
economy, have ruinous effect, suggests Christine Lagarde, the International Monetary 
Fund chief: “it [new trade barriers] would certainly have a negative impact on global 
growth”, “uncertainty… undermines investment appetites and decision making”  
(Donnan, Tett, Fleming; 2016). Lagarde has focused her attention in the discussion of 
protectionism primarily on the developed countries, particularly the United States and 
the United Kingdom, adding that in the past the rise of protectionism has preceded 
many wars. 
 
The interconnection between politics and uncertainty is felt in the other parts of the 
world as well, which became a major topic of discussion for the 2016 meeting of the 
Group of Twenty of the International Monetary Fund. With the terms of Brexit 
negotiations and the outcome of the US presidential elections remaining unclear, 
growth prospects seem anemic. Chinese finance minister Jiwei noted that “The 
uncertainties and risks facing the world economy have increased as some major 
economies have entered the general-election season,” (Talley 2016). 
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An interconnection between populist policies, mainly those opposing liberalization of 
trade and imposing new tariffs, and economic growth deserves special attention. The 
two are interdependent and serve as catalysts for aggravating the effects of one 
another: as populist policies turn to more protectionist measures of imposing additional 
trade barriers, these policies weaken long-term economic growth, which further fuels 
the admiration for such policies, creating a vicious cycle, where the populist agenda 
and weakening economic growth intensify each other (Azevedo, cited in Talley, 2016). 
This interdependence has been particularly remarkable in Argentina in the time of 
Peronism (Ocampo, 2016). 
 
The emergence of uncertainty as a primary source of political risk has been widely 
noted in recent years (Zeckhauser,2013; Knight, in Langlois and Cosgel, 1993).  
Nevertheless, little is done in regards to the development of the strategies of 
uncertainty mitigation. Moran (1998) cites local business interests, decentralization of 
power, corruption, organized crime and pressure of NGOs as the “new” sources of risk. 
While this point of view is in full accordance with the situation in many parts of the 
world, it does not reflect the recent rise of uncertainty in the developed and developing 
worlds alike. Overholt (1982) mentions “policy” and “institutional instability”, arguing 
that in the absence of the policy continuity a foreign investor may face the risks 
associated with the changes in labour law, taxation and exchange rates; as well as 
sudden shifts in the separation of powers may complicate an investor’s decision 
making process.  
 
However, it is debatable that policy and institutional instability fully capture the specifics 
of modern-day uncertainty. As previously mentioned in this work, the terms “policy 
instability” or “institutional instability” are in many ways ill-suited if used to describe the 
Brexit referendum, as well as the presidential elections in the United States: both 
referendums and elections are the very bedrock of democracy and, to the contrary of 
institutional instability, represent the standard democratic procedures.  
 
The two events serve as perfect examples of how existing political risk methodologies 
are unable to account for the growing risks of political uncertainty. Forbes’ Jonathan 
Webb (2015) did not mention Britain’s referendum or the US presidential campaign in 
his list of the biggest political risks for business in 2016, concentrating on more conven-
tional sorts of risk, such as terrorism, oil prices, instability in the developing world etc.  
 
17 (39) 
 
 
Tina Fordham and Jan Techau (2016) of Carnegie Europe, a European branch of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, despite pointing out the importance of 
the “New Socio-Economic Risks” referring to the rise of populism and non-mainstream 
political forces, have only mentioned Brexit as a possible result of the European refu-
gee crisis, rather than a political risk by itself. Marsh LLC (2016), one of the world’s 
biggest insurance brokerage and risk management firms, in its “Geopolitical Threats for 
the Year Ahead: Marsh’s Political Risk Map 2016”, has mentioned 2016 US elections 
as a risk only in relation to tougher foreign policy, while the probability of Brexit was 
estimated at 35% with a reference to BMI research.  
 
Therefore, it seems arguable whether the existing definitions of the risks are able to 
cover and explain the ongoing rise of uncertainty in many parts of the world.  Various 
current models of quantifications and mitigation of risks are more equipped for more 
traditional  risks of the past, while more recent signs of political uncertainty, putting to 
risk investments in the developing and developed worlds alike, demand more in-detail 
examination, forecast and mitigating strategies. While methods of international 
insurance, forecasting the turns of the political course, various quantification and 
qualification approaches were suitable for avoiding the risks of expropriation, 
nationalization, corruption etc., can they adequately address the risks of losing the 
value of investments caused by uncertainty after Brexit, or the presidential elections? 
 
The rising challenges of political uncertainty, lately exhibited by investment risks as 
consequences of Brexit and mounting market volatility as a result of the presidential 
campaign in the US require newer, more sophisticated approaches to the mitigation of 
political risks. The new approaches should be adapted to the changing political 
environment everywhere in the world, taking into account uncertainty along with other 
factors of risk for the risk methodologies to be inclusive with respect to growing political 
uncertainty. 
 
The factors of risk that could complement the existing political risk methodologies 
should include the most recent developments in the political environment of today, thus 
adapting these methodologies to the new forms of political risk. Special attention must 
be paid to the risks emerging in the developed world – particularly in the European 
Union and the United States: while the developing world has been a source of 
traditional type of political risks, such as revolutions, civil wars and expropriation, the 
developed world, which has been regarded until recently as a “safe haven” for the 
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foreign direct investments, has witnessed new, unconventional forms of risk manifest 
themselves. Moreover, uncertainty originating in these countries may have more 
global, far reaching consequences due to the size of countries’ economies and a 
number of supply chains originating in the countries of the Europe and North America. 
Apart from the aforementioned Britain’s secession from the European Union and the 
2016 United States presidential campaign, many other processes and events 
comprising political atmosphere of the EU and North America can be the subject of 
analysis for establishing a number of new factors of political risk.  
 
As such, a sudden rise of the new political forces across the political spectrum and 
subsequent reshuffling of the of the parliaments and governments of many European 
countries seems to be an important topic, as in some cases it caused a drastic change 
in course of policies and further promoted political uncertainty in Europe.  
 
In a similar manner, centrifugal forces in the European Union may present an obstacle 
to the process of further economic integration of European markets, putting to risk the 
capital invested in these markets. Although the topic by itself is not new and separatist 
movements have existed in Europe for a long time, their recent revival and associated 
new trends must be examined in more detail.    
 
Social consensus has undoubtedly been a factor affecting the political stability of a 
country. Absence of social consensus is a potential determinant of the state’s inability 
to secure the support of the electorate and function effectively, therefore fueling market 
uncertainty.  
 
The rise of populism, which has been exhibited by emergence of new political parties 
and social movements in Europe and the US, has a potential to deepen the political 
divisions and accelerate political instability. Similarly, with the first two factors, populism 
has been one of the key determinants fueling political instability in the US and Europe 
(Speciale, 2016).  
 
Weak governments or inability to form a government coalition has been a feature of the 
political situation of some European countries during the last 10 years. Stemming from 
other factors, such as absence of social consensus, this factor can increase 
unpredictability about the future of the political course of the country, thus adding to the 
uncertainty of investors.  
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3.1.1 Social consensus 
 
Ability to forge a social consensus is an important aspect ensuring a well-functioning 
democracy. It helps to address the most divisive matters, and, as a reflection of the 
democratic traditions, consensus serves as a way of mutual concessions to ensure that 
the interests of all major parties of the society are included in the decision-making 
process, particularly on the most vulnerable public issues. In his work “The Idea of an 
Overlapping Consensus” (1987) Rawls notes that consensus is the core principle of 
political liberalism, which helps different groups with different fundamental values agree 
on certain principles, thus maintaining the stability of basic institutions. 
 
The absence of such a consensus on any problem at a national level, therefore, 
threatens to bring the political life of a country to turmoil, polarize opinions within one 
nation, creating a background for social unrest and thus fuel political instability.  In the 
United States, some authors (Smith, 2015) argue that the growing political polarization 
causes the historically low level of trust in the federal government.  
 
Therefore, given the importance of presence of the social consensus in the society, I 
believe that it will be an important factor to complement the existing political risk 
methodologies. 
3.1.2 New political parties and movements 
 
The political atmosphere of Europe and the United States alike has been recently 
marked by the evolution of new political actors. Spanning all across the political 
spectrum, the new parties and movements can be primarily characterized by a 
common feature of anti-establishment orientation and deep opposition to the existing, 
more traditional political forces. Having quickly risen in popularity, these new political 
parties have proven to be able to push their own agenda, although not necessarily 
being present in government.  
 
In the United States, a special interest in this regard deserves the Tea Party movement 
– a conservative group particularly notable for its criticism of the US Government 
financial crisis rescue plans and Federal Health care system. Some studies (Skocpol 
and Williamson, cited in Zakaria, 2016) suggest that the main reason behind Tea Party 
followers’ opposition to the establishment political parties is rather cultural than 
economic.  
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In Europe, the main driver behind the emergence of anti-establishment parties was 
initially Euroscepticism, while later the immigrant and economic crises in the EU 
periphery furthered the creation of the next generation populist movements (Muddle, 
2016).  
Perhaps one of the most notable example of the anti-EU movement in Europe is the 
United Kingdom Independence Party.  According to the former leader of the Labour 
Party Ed Miliband, it was UKIP’s rising popularity which made British Prime Minister 
David Cameron call for a referendum on the Britain’s membership in the European 
Union (Watson, 2013).   
 
Other notable examples include the French National Front and Dutch Party for 
Freedom, which have similarly been described as parties of anti-EU and anti-immigrant 
ideologies. Both parties, being represented in the European Parliament, are aiming at 
restructuring the distribution of power in the EU back to the nation states, including the 
issuance of national currencies and strict control over immigration (Chrisafis, 2016). 
Successful electoral and opinion poll performance of many of the anti-establishment 
movements show that these parties are able to change the political disposition and 
affect the current course of political and economic development of the countries of 
Western Europe.  
3.1.3 Rise of populism 
 
Closely related to the previous factor, the rise of populist rhetoric has characterized 
European politics for the last few years. Catalyzed by economic distress in the 
European periphery, terrorist attacks and a refugee crisis, populism spurred the 
political rise of the right-wing anti-establishment movements and paved the way to 
power for some of them. At the same time, on the other side of political spectrum, 
unpopular austerity measures and deteriorating economic situation have assisted the 
popularity of leftist populists, particularly in Greece and Spain (Muddle, 2016). 
 
One of the most striking examples is Hungary, where the government of Viktor Orban 
is openly set to completely reshuffle the existing liberal order by limiting the 
independence of the judicial system and the media (Rovny, 2016). Similarly, the Polish 
Law and Justice Party, currently holding the majority of the seats in both Houses of the 
Polish Parliament, is set to limit the power of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal, 
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threatening to prosecute the current head judge, with little regard to the protests of the 
EU and the US leaders (Kelemen, 2016). 
 
These developments, whether positive or negative for the countries themselves, pose a 
serious threat to the existing liberal order in the EU, thus fueling political uncertainty in 
these markets. Therefore, the extent of popularity of populist rhetoric should be closely 
examined as an aspect of uncertainty and therefore risk. 
3.1.4 Centrifugal tendencies 
 
Separatist, secessionist or centrifugal tendencies have been long present in Europe 
and have recently gained a new pace. In Spain, one of the wealthiest districts, 
Catalonia, has huge public support for the idea of seeking independence from the 
central government, with the issue of independence dominating regional elections and 
the last two presidents being strongly in favour of secession from Spain. Similar trends 
in Scotland and Northern Italy demonstrate that the risks of separatism are existent 
throughout Europe, endangering the existing trend for Europe’s economic integration. 
3.1.5 Weak governments 
 
Weak government coalitions or inability to form a government have been 
demonstrated, for example, in Belgium, where twice in last 10 years the formation of 
the government took more than a year, with both cases regarded to be stemming from 
the cultural differences of the two main groups of Belgian population, whose regions 
also tend to have significant differences in formations of their economies (Sciolino, 
2007).  Then there is the more recent example of Italy, where government instability 
has caused the Prime Minister Renzi to call a national referendum on constitutional 
reform. Should Renzi fail, however, the results can be even more troubling, bringing 
more market turmoil and political instability (Balmer, Ognibene, 2016).  
 
Therefore, I believe as the nature of political risk changes, new, uncertainty-adapted 
factors of risk should be taken into account. The factors of (1) presence of social 
consensus in a society, (2) popularity of new, extreme political parties, (3) the level of 
populism in the political rhetoric, (4) presence of centrifugal tendencies and (5) the 
ability of political parties to form a strong government can further complement the 
existing models of quantification of political risk for the latter to become more inclusive 
with respect to the transforming nature of political risk. 
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3.2 Transition: new frontiers of political risk 
 
The transformation of the political risks discussed previously in this work have come 
hand in hand with another trend, largely unnoticed in the literature on this topic: the 
extent of homegrown political risk, or the risk originating in Europe and the United 
States, most recently marked by the examples of Brexit and the US Presidential 
elections of 2016. These have broken the traditional view of the developing world as 
the main source of political risk – a view that was shared by various authors before 
(Overholt, 1982). At the same time, the surprising result of the British referendum has 
caused consequences far outside the United Kingdom and the European Union: the 
International Monetary Fund announced its global growth forecast for the year 2017 
(IMF, 2016), following multiple warnings on the potential negative effects of Brexit on 
the British economy. It is undoubtedly the case that such major changes call for the 
restructuring of the models that are used to assess political risks, and that political risk 
now manifest itself in the part of the world that was seen as much less volatile before. It 
also seems clear now that even in the absence of traditional political risks, such as 
revolutions and coups d’étât, regular elections or referendums can be just as disruptive 
to the political stability of a country. 
 
A careful examination of the possible outcomes of the Britain’s withdrawal from the 
European Union and its major reasons is necessary to understand how risks of these 
sort can be mitigated in the future.   
 
In the United States, a similar pattern can be found in the 2016 Presidential elections. 
Just as in post-Brexit United Kingdom, the opposition to the freedom of international 
trade may cause many investors to revise their investment decisions, possibly affecting 
the image of the United States as the host-country for the Foreign Direct Investment.  
I believe that analyzing the two cases will be helpful in determining how these events 
are fueling the political uncertainty, why the existing political risk assessment tools 
were not prepared to estimate the extent of the consequences these events will have 
and how modelling of political risk can be modified to be able to anticipate risks of this 
sort in future. 
3.2.1 The US presidential elections of 2016 
 
Although it will probably take years for all potential consequences of the US 
Presidential elections to materialize, there are early signs that the implications, both 
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positive and negative, will be experienced by many industries of the economy of the US 
and in many other parts of the world, which can significantly alter the investment 
climate of the US economy. 
 
Among many others, healthcare can become one of the first industries to experience 
the results of the election, most particularly in the event of Clinton’s victory, given her 
criticism of the raising of medicines’ prices. Similarly, some analysts predict a tougher 
regulation of the banking industry were she to win (Yglesias, 2016).  
 
In the same manner, the policies that Trump plans to implement may have far reaching 
consequences both for the United States and the world. The possibility of massive 
reduction of taxation in the United States may open doors to further raising the federal 
debt ceiling, which would in turn put significant pressure on the United States budget 
with respect to its interest payments on the debt. Propositions of tightening foreign 
trade policies, resembling features of economic nationalism, go against the global trend 
of liberalization of international trade, thus putting barriers to economic cooperation 
between the United States and other countries, and specifically endangering countries 
with high levels of exports to the US and the US investment climate. All of these plans 
would have a tremendous impact on business confidence within the United States and 
its investment outlook abroad. 
 
In regard to the rhetoric of economic nationalism, an interesting question is what 
causes the social demand for these policies. According to Kazin (2016), the appeal to 
populism, found in the campaigns of Trump and Bernie Sanders, stems from the 
electorate’s demand for greater equality, dissatisfaction with the ruling class and the 
competition in the labour market.  
3.2.2 Brexit 
 
Although the major consequences of Britain’s secession from the European Union can 
only be estimated after the agreement on future terms between the United Kingdom 
and the bloc, preliminary outcomes can already be drawn. In general, the OECD (2016) 
predicts the fall of GDP of over 3% in the coming years and a drop in the labour 
productivity of the British economy. Brexit has already caused the British Pound to 
plunge against other currencies, while uncertainty about the future of the agreements 
between the UK and the EU is making many banks relocate their headquarters to 
continental Europe (Arnold, 2016).  
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However, perhaps even larger damage was done to the image of the United Kingdom 
as a host country of foreign direct investment. Due to the potential loss of access to the 
single market of the EU, some foreign investors may be revising the placement of their 
production capabilities in the country, particularly in the automotive industry. The 
financial services industry, the largest line of inward FDI investment in the United 
Kingdom, may also suffer significant losses should Britain not be able to retain 
membership of the European Single Market.  
 
Apart from estimating the potential consequences of Brexit, it is important to point out 
why such a turn of events has not been accounted for in advance, and why the major 
interested parties have not been prepared for it. Sullivan and Fisman (2016) suggest 
that the markets have put too much trust in their belief in economic efficiency: while by 
multiple forecasts leaving the European Union was a less economically viable choice, 
most of the voters were instead influenced by non-economic factors in this referendum, 
such as, for example, their personal views of migration and security.  
 
In this regard, Brexit and the US Presidential elections have a number of common 
features. Both represent the newer generation of political risk, where risk is constituted 
not by specific factors as before, but rather by general political uncertainty. The two 
events are taking place in countries, traditionally viewed safe for the foreign direct 
investment, and the both events were not accounted by the economic agents that are 
now experiencing its pressure. Moreover, the two events were developing with an 
influence of the populist appeal, while rational market theories have failed to win the 
preference of the electorate. I believe that the new factors of risk, which I suggested 
above should be implemented in the political risk quantification models, will help to 
address this issue. 
3.3 Oil 
 
Of all the commodities, oil is often described as the one “having biggest geopolitical 
importance” and, according to Klare (2002), is the one to most likely provoke a conflict 
between states. This does not come as a surprise, given oil’s significant role in 
economies of many states and its special status as the most widely used source of 
energy: oil accounts for 40% of total energy consumption, with its products being a key 
raw material in production of diesel fuel and gasoline, heating oil, plastics and other 
materials. Due to its multiple applications in various sectors of the economy, oil 
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continues to be the most important source of energy: “Petroleum is the most versatile 
fuel source ever discovered [and is] situated at the core of the modern industrial 
economy. … It is the only energy source that can be used across the board – in space 
heating, as an industrial fuel supply, and as a means to generate electricity…” (Morse, 
1999 cited in Klare, 2002).  
 
Therefore, given the strategic economic importance of oil, it does not come as a 
surprise that the commodity has been a cause of many conflicts, both within states and 
internationally. Given that the majority of oil production and reserves are concentrated 
in just a few states, which enjoy a wide control over its price and distribution, oil prices 
quite often became a question of politics rather than economics, as it was during the 
1973 Oil crisis. 
 
Since not all oil exporters may enjoy such advantage, some of them may seek to 
control those oil resources that are situated within their borders. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the oil industry assets are some of the first that the government 
nationalizes when it enters the time of economic hardship. Multiple examples can be 
found, perhaps the most significant being the nationalization of Argentina’s YPF 
previously controlled by Spanish Repsol. The case has received extensive coverage in 
the media and literature due to the size of the stake – approximately USD 10 billion, 
and the fact that the government of Kristina Fernandez Kirchner did not initially propose 
any compensation for the nationalized assets.  
 
Although it is debatable what was the main motive behind the expropriation of YPF, 
Argentina’s then-President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner referred to energy as a 
"vital resource" and a matter of “public interest” when submitting the draft of the law to 
the Senate (Plummer, 2012). Expropriation was believed to have a potential to damage 
Argentina’s reputation as a place to invest and to deter foreign direct investment in the 
country (Segura, cited in Buenos Aires Herald, 2012). 
 
Although Repsol has eventually agreed to accept compensation from the Argentina’s 
government in February 2012 in the total sum of USD 5 billion, the deal could hardly be 
regarded as satisfactory for the Spanish company given the initial compensation of 
USD 10.5 billion Repsol suggested. Moreover, Johnson and Webber (2013) have cited 
the pressure from the investors that the company’s management has been 
experiencing to accept the deal. According to Johnson and Webber (2013), two of the 
26 (39) 
 
 
three Repsol’s largest shareholders – namely Spanish La Caixa bank and Mexican oil 
company Pemex, have urged Repsol’s CEO Antonio Brafau to withdraw the company’s 
initial claim for USD 10.5 billion for its expropriated stake in YPF and instead accept a 
deal of a 47% stake in a company that has rights to 6% of Vaca Muerta, a major 
Argentian shale oil site, which was first discovered by YPF when it was under Repsol’s 
control. Pemex has gone as far as threatening to sell its 9,37% share of Repsol, in 
case the company would agree to the deal, as reported by Johnson and Webber 
(2013), according to whom the Repsol’s CEO and the Sacyr, the second largest 
shareholder, were in opposition to the proposal.  
 
It is obvious that seizing the assets of a foreign company, should it fall under a 
definition of expropriation, taken by the government of Kirchner is a serious violation of 
international investment treaties, such as International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID).  However, it is also obvious that the government of a 
country, that exercises the full authority over all the assets on its territory, is much more 
powerful than a single company, while international investment treaties are usually 
signed by two governments and does not include a guarantor party. 
The contradiction between national law and international investment protection treaties 
arises due to the lack of mechanisms in which such complex situations can be 
resolved, thereby adding uncertainty to any potential foreign direct investment. 
International institutions that would have the power to resolve international investment 
disputes can also be a factor of further ensuring a more stable flow of investments into 
the developing economies. For example, such institution may be established by the 
International Monetary Fund, which would consider the country’s compliance with the 
terms of investment contracts in its decisions of issuing loans or economic assistance 
to its member states. Similarly, World Trade Organization, which already has a 
powerful dispute settlement apparatus, has a potential to expand its jurisdiction over 
international investment disputes.  
 
Alternatively, the United States, the European Union and other large economies may 
form a new institution for the protection of investors’ rights, of which they would serve 
as guarantors, persuading other countries to follow the principles set by the agency 
and referring to the policy of economic isolation to the country that breaks the rules of 
this institution. Since most of the countries of the world have close economic ties with 
either the United States or the European Union, this institution may become a powerful 
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tool in protection of the rights of international investors and further incentivizing foreign 
direct investment. 
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4 Conclusions 
 
In order to the capture the transforming nature of political risk, it is necessary first to 
establish its definition, which would entail various aspects of political risk in their 
entirety. For the purpose of this work, various existing definitions were analyzed, it was 
pointed out that not all of them correctly address the transformation of political risk 
taking place presently, on the basis of which a new definition was adopted with the 
purpose of being more inclusive with respect to the trend of growing political 
uncertainty. 
 
The existing views on sources of risk were analyzed with the intention of assessing of 
how adequate they are in addressing the most recent political risk challenges. As the 
challenges of Brexit and the United States presidential elections were to a significant 
degree underestimated in the risk analyses, this work set out to find new factors of 
political risk, which being implemented in the existing risk measuring models would be 
more adapted to the emerging sources of risk. On the basis of the cases mentioned, 
five new factors were established. The presence of social consensus, as an important 
factor of a well-functioning democracy, helps the society to overcome the most decisive 
decisions, thus ensuring political stability. Emergence of new political forces, mainly of 
anti-establishment and populist nature, threatens to undermine the existing course 
toward globalization and economic cooperation in developed economies and expose 
the existing liberal political order to instability. Similarly, populist rhetoric in many 
countries of the developed world develop a vicious circle, where slowing economic 
growth spur a social demand for populist measures, which in turn catalyze worsening 
economic conditions. Centrifugal forces in many countries of the European Union 
cause a danger to the very existence of the nation states and fueling market 
uncertainty. Weak governments and inability to create and maintain strong government 
coalitions, having multiple examples in the European Union, is another factor of political 
risk, as uncertainty about the future of the political course of the state contributes to the 
growing uncertainty. Thus, these five factors of political risk, being implemented in the 
risk quantification models used today, can significantly improve the risk mitigation 
strategies in foreign direct investment. 
 
Changing geography is another important trend in transformation of political risk. As 
was pointed out in this work, political risk has been recently exhibiting itself in the 
countries and regions that were previously considered to be less risky, of which the 
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Britain’s secession from the European Union and the United States presidential 
election serve as the most recent examples. Further research will be necessary in this 
regard, as the potential outcomes of emerging homegrown political risk cannot be 
overestimated – not only due to the size of the economies of these countries, but also 
due to the amount of supply chains that are originating in the developed world. Analysis 
of the two cases has also shown that even in the seemingly politically stable countries, 
such as those of Western Europe and North America, political risks now manifests itself 
in rather unexpected ways: as such, referendums and elections, which are standard 
democratic procedures, are now be regarded as sources of uncertainty. The new 
factors of political risk, pointed out in this work, are to address these issues. 
 
The strategic importance of oil and protection of assets in oil industry is a perfect 
example of the fact that along with the new types of risk, the more traditional threats of 
expropriation and nationalization still persist. As demonstrated in the case of Repsol’s 
share in YPF, there is little to protect a foreign investor from belligerent actions of a 
national government, while international investment treaties, such as ICSID, have a 
limited power in solving international investment disputes and having its decisions 
being executed. Therefore, a need in a new institution arises, an institution which would 
have the power to resolve the investment disputes between governments and 
investors. Such institution can be established by already existing organization, for 
example WTO or IMF. These organizations can oversee the compliance with 
investment agreements by their member states and resort to special procedures should 
such agreements be breached. For example, IMF could consider a country’s standards 
of investment protection when deciding on issuing loans. Similar organization could be 
founded by the US, EU and other major economies, where they would serve as 
guarantors in contract between other governments and international investors, thus 
ensuring that both parties follow the agreements and resorting to the policy of 
economic isolation towards the states that persistently disregard the standards of 
investment protection.  
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